Yes, the Chowdahfest was a week ago, and I seem to be slipping into the habit of posting about an event a week after it occurs. Ech! some of my students might say I'm breaking my own records by letting as little as a week slip by; witness how "fast" I get papers back! In any case, this is a festive celebration that has become an English Department tradition for some years now: inviting English Major alums, in conjunction with Clark's Alumni-In-Residence event, to come by and talk to the current undergrads and grad students about "life after the English Major"; or, "How Lit-ter-chure Prepared Me for Life." For me, it's wonderfully satisfying, since usually at least one of them is an old advisee, and I get to keep in touch.
Our guests on Friday were (from left to right below) Heidi Gitelman '80, Betsy Hopkins '97, and Jennifer C. Smith '95. Betsy was my advisee this time, and she reminded me that I had cobbled together a double major for her in English and Theater Arts; the aging synapses controlling memory being what they are, my response was, "I did? I must have known then what I don't know now."
They all mentioned in various ways how the emphases on research, analysis and writing connected with the English major had given them invaluable experience in managing and assessing all kinds of diverse data--interactive television documentaries for Heidi; IT for Betsy; Education Programs Manager at Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island for Jennifer (and these are only the most recent manifestations of many career moves for each of them)--but in the question-and-answer session afterwards I suggested that they had foregrounded yet another facet of English study that I hadn't realized in previous Chowdahfests. Threaded through all their employment sagas was a celebration of a deep acquaintance and proven ability to work with narrative: the familiarity with narrative essential to an English major was common to each; their work was successful because they could tell stories and listen to them as well. Wildly various stories, true--from documentaries to IT programmatic narratives to organizational stories to qualify for grant funding--but stories nonetheless. Honest stories, with character and plot; not little fibs or grand confabulations (which seem to be the narratives du jour of our current national political scene), but narratives shaped by and shaping the parameters and direction of their work. Hey, I thought, that's a recommendation for the major I'll gladly support!
So the chowdah was good, the conversation was better, and I hope everyone who attended found something to take away--besides leftover cookies, that is.
--Jay
Friday, October 26, 2007
Monday, October 22, 2007
Blogs of Interest. . . .
For a couple of weeks now I've been meaning to post the links to two student blogs that I think show how Clarkies can take advantage of this medium. The first is Lana Petersson's from her semester abroad last spring in Mexico; she's back this year as a senior doing an Honors Thesis, which is a short novel based on some of the experiences she posted. In other words, her blogging is furnishing material for her fiction: neat trick, no? Many authors--virtually all those who have become media-savvy--create web sites for their published works, but an increasing number have been using their posts as "rough drafts" for their books (here's my friend and blog mentor Stephanie, for example)--mostly non-fiction, but some fiction as well. Writers like Lana find that this inverted process--from blog to book--bears tasty fruit.
The other blog is Susan Monroe's Sweet As; she graduated in '05, and chronicles her years since then in New Zealand and Antarctica, as well as this past summer in the Rockies. She's intrigued by travel writing, and the blog offers a tremendous opportunity to try out her descriptive capabilities as well as develop a traveling persona.
All you people who want to write: take a lesson from all three of these writers, and practice, practice, practice! A blog is an ideal place to do it!
--Jay
Update: I forgot to add that all three blogs have wealths of photos--displayed in various formats. That, says Stephanie, is one of the primary requirements for a successful blog.
The other blog is Susan Monroe's Sweet As; she graduated in '05, and chronicles her years since then in New Zealand and Antarctica, as well as this past summer in the Rockies. She's intrigued by travel writing, and the blog offers a tremendous opportunity to try out her descriptive capabilities as well as develop a traveling persona.
All you people who want to write: take a lesson from all three of these writers, and practice, practice, practice! A blog is an ideal place to do it!
--Jay
Update: I forgot to add that all three blogs have wealths of photos--displayed in various formats. That, says Stephanie, is one of the primary requirements for a successful blog.
Wednesday, October 17, 2007
Questions of Faith
Last Wednesday, the 10th, I delayed my drive home to attend the "spoken word chorus" called "Questions of Faith," part of the Difficult Dialogues program and organized and coordinated by the Department's Meredith Neuman. It was most impressive, and one of the best things about it was that the script was co-written, along with Meredith, by two of our senior English Majors: Ayaan Agane on the left, and Heather Cenedella on the right. Kudos to them!
The program consisted of four sections, with four Clark actors--Christopher Church, Lee Gaines, Kate Rafey, and Zo Tobi--performing a variety of voices and perspectives drawn from one-on-one interviews with Clark students talking about their "experiences with issues of faith and religion on campus" (Program Notes).
I thought the rhythms of the interwoven voices established a richness that was stunning. All beliefs, from fundamentalist to dogged atheist, counterpointed each other. In fact, one of the best features, to my mind, was a "fugue": the four voices spoke over, around and past each other citing different ceremonial practices and positions to weave a tapestry of sound, in which meaning was subservient to the punctuated sound itself. I knew people were speaking, but I could not understand any one of them alone within the rise and fall of musical speech. The effect was vertiginous, but movingly similar to what the "gift of tongues" must sound like. Marvelous experience; and I hear that the whole thing was videotaped as well. Double marvelous.
Thank you, Meredith. And Ayaan and Heather: quite the sense of verbal artitecture! Bravo!
--Jay
Wednesday, October 10, 2007
Response to Zach's Response to Difference/Differance
ZB,
I just knew you would jump in in defence of Derrida. Haha! I saw merit in Derrida's argument for difference. I simply pointed out the complexity involved in conceptualizing and applying the same. I suggest that Derrida's argument seems to gloss over the politics often involved in ascribing difference whether on a micro/macro linguistic level or within larger varied cultures and communities. I argue for difference-- be not mistaken-- but just that centres and margins are not necessarily as arbitrary as the undertones of Derrida's argument imply. I still maintain that hegemonies and politics nuance what is centre and what is marginalized.
On the matter of your "slight rebuttal":-), I was not suggesting that sameness be privileged over difference. I know that difference defines all aspects of our existence, linguistic and otherwise. My reference to sameness was one highlighting pattern formation in learning. Learning is about making links, forming patterns as much as it is about making distinctions and finding the loopholes in those patterns. I did say that eventually it is difference which has baby grasp the concept. That what is different must validate itself to baby is not necessarily due to the dangers of grouping as you imply but to the dangers of assuming that what came first is the essential centre and what is being added is inferior 'other'. Indeed, grouping and homogenizing concepts whether in learning or identity formation is as you insinuate, sloppy and lazy thinking which, even for the lethargic, is not always practical.
The very processes of differentiation in involve pattern formation which invariably tap into some level of 'sameness' before difference...although I am not even sure whether chronology is essential to my original argument. Still, you rebut my argument by first agreeing upon the central text of interrogation- Derridian differance. That being established as one fundamental commonality between us (along with the linguistic and discursive tools of interpretation which we also share), you could then express (with your usual eloquence) the points of difference between our perspectives. I don't doubt that difference may indeed preexist verisimilitude...when it comes to perceiving and expressing this, the latter takes preeminence. How could I have seen your argument as different is we did not share a common ground from which to differ? Baby sees human beings before gender; teaching baby "mom" and "dad" is one way parents help create necessary difference in the world of the child.
All in all, I only implore us to consider agenda that may be at work (though not necessarily) in the complex world of differance. I reiterate that it is not simply a continuum of differences, there are centres and margins, invariably affected by specifically what is deemed 'centre' and margin and by whom.
I just knew you would jump in in defence of Derrida. Haha! I saw merit in Derrida's argument for difference. I simply pointed out the complexity involved in conceptualizing and applying the same. I suggest that Derrida's argument seems to gloss over the politics often involved in ascribing difference whether on a micro/macro linguistic level or within larger varied cultures and communities. I argue for difference-- be not mistaken-- but just that centres and margins are not necessarily as arbitrary as the undertones of Derrida's argument imply. I still maintain that hegemonies and politics nuance what is centre and what is marginalized.
On the matter of your "slight rebuttal":-), I was not suggesting that sameness be privileged over difference. I know that difference defines all aspects of our existence, linguistic and otherwise. My reference to sameness was one highlighting pattern formation in learning. Learning is about making links, forming patterns as much as it is about making distinctions and finding the loopholes in those patterns. I did say that eventually it is difference which has baby grasp the concept. That what is different must validate itself to baby is not necessarily due to the dangers of grouping as you imply but to the dangers of assuming that what came first is the essential centre and what is being added is inferior 'other'. Indeed, grouping and homogenizing concepts whether in learning or identity formation is as you insinuate, sloppy and lazy thinking which, even for the lethargic, is not always practical.
The very processes of differentiation in involve pattern formation which invariably tap into some level of 'sameness' before difference...although I am not even sure whether chronology is essential to my original argument. Still, you rebut my argument by first agreeing upon the central text of interrogation- Derridian differance. That being established as one fundamental commonality between us (along with the linguistic and discursive tools of interpretation which we also share), you could then express (with your usual eloquence) the points of difference between our perspectives. I don't doubt that difference may indeed preexist verisimilitude...when it comes to perceiving and expressing this, the latter takes preeminence. How could I have seen your argument as different is we did not share a common ground from which to differ? Baby sees human beings before gender; teaching baby "mom" and "dad" is one way parents help create necessary difference in the world of the child.
All in all, I only implore us to consider agenda that may be at work (though not necessarily) in the complex world of differance. I reiterate that it is not simply a continuum of differences, there are centres and margins, invariably affected by specifically what is deemed 'centre' and margin and by whom.
Tuesday, October 9, 2007
The Failure of Theory/Philosophy
In response to the recent discussion on Derrida, "differance," and literary theory, I would like to bring up a point of serious contention for me, and that is the language within theory/philosophy. To start off, I would like to quote a favorite author of mine on the topic. His name is Terry Goodkind, and I'm sure some of you have heard of him (he writes fantasy mainly). I have changed some of the wording to make it a bit clearer on how I see this to be relevant.
"When you read about [theory or philosophy] it’s crucially important to keep in mind that those who try to make it so complex as to be impenetrable to the “lay mind” have a motive for clouding their views: those views won’t stand up to the light of reason...Some [theorists or philosophers] use big words [or abstract concepts] to try to make their beliefs sound scholarly and important or, worse, to hide the fact that their beliefs don’t make any sense. [One should not] ever allow such people to bully you with their attempts to make philosophy impossibly complex, or intimidate you into accepting what they say."
Bearing this in mind, why is it that some theorists or philosophers are quite clear and succinct in their explanation, where others fail so miserably? Derrida in my opinion is arguably one of the most confusing theorists to read, and yet so much of post-structuralist thought stems from his ideas of differance, and Saussure's signifier and signified. The purpose of language is to be understood and to communicate one's ideas. If your thesis isn't clear in a paper, or your professor does not understand what you are talking about, your grade suffers. If a politician stands up in a debate or conference, and, like Kerry, "bungles" a joke or a concept, serious negative response can, and likely will, follow. Where do theorists fit in with this? It seems to me that somehow they escape the necessity for clarity in writing. Why?
I think perhaps Goodkind may be on to something, when he suggests that theorists and philosophers can't make themselves clear and use complex concepts to hide what will not hold up. I don't know that it is necessarily true that a theorist would do this deliberately (at least I would hope not!), but I do think there is a reason behind this obfuscation. It may suggest that the theorist himself does not fully understand the concept he is supposed to be enlightened with! If he is not able to explain it clearly, what is the point in suggesting it at all? I would much rather have a theorist admit that it is difficult to explain such a concept, and then concede that the best way he can think of to explain it is by some example. Instead, you have some theorists/philosophers who continue on in their discussion as though it were the most clear and apparent thing in the world. This cavalier attitude allows the theorist/philosopher an "untouchable" status--if one does not understand the concept, then one must be unenlightened or unable to understand it--and almost puts the blame on the reader, instead of the writer, for failing to comprehend the theory.
"Well, that's all great and everything, Steve, but what are you suggesting?"
I'd say that the best way to continue exploring theory and criticism is to just go with what you understand, or the parts that we understand. If we are unable to grasp a concept purported by a theorist/philosopher, the blame is most honestly placed at the feet of the "expressor", not the reader. I think of it this way--if subscribers to a particular school have a hard time explaining a topic advocated by the founder, it probably wasn't that clear or well explained. We can only do our best, take what we can get from it, and then move on to the next bit. After all, if Derrida can take a concept from Saussure and use it in a way that makes it his own, we can do the same with what we do understand.
"When you read about [theory or philosophy] it’s crucially important to keep in mind that those who try to make it so complex as to be impenetrable to the “lay mind” have a motive for clouding their views: those views won’t stand up to the light of reason...Some [theorists or philosophers] use big words [or abstract concepts] to try to make their beliefs sound scholarly and important or, worse, to hide the fact that their beliefs don’t make any sense. [One should not] ever allow such people to bully you with their attempts to make philosophy impossibly complex, or intimidate you into accepting what they say."
Bearing this in mind, why is it that some theorists or philosophers are quite clear and succinct in their explanation, where others fail so miserably? Derrida in my opinion is arguably one of the most confusing theorists to read, and yet so much of post-structuralist thought stems from his ideas of differance, and Saussure's signifier and signified. The purpose of language is to be understood and to communicate one's ideas. If your thesis isn't clear in a paper, or your professor does not understand what you are talking about, your grade suffers. If a politician stands up in a debate or conference, and, like Kerry, "bungles" a joke or a concept, serious negative response can, and likely will, follow. Where do theorists fit in with this? It seems to me that somehow they escape the necessity for clarity in writing. Why?
I think perhaps Goodkind may be on to something, when he suggests that theorists and philosophers can't make themselves clear and use complex concepts to hide what will not hold up. I don't know that it is necessarily true that a theorist would do this deliberately (at least I would hope not!), but I do think there is a reason behind this obfuscation. It may suggest that the theorist himself does not fully understand the concept he is supposed to be enlightened with! If he is not able to explain it clearly, what is the point in suggesting it at all? I would much rather have a theorist admit that it is difficult to explain such a concept, and then concede that the best way he can think of to explain it is by some example. Instead, you have some theorists/philosophers who continue on in their discussion as though it were the most clear and apparent thing in the world. This cavalier attitude allows the theorist/philosopher an "untouchable" status--if one does not understand the concept, then one must be unenlightened or unable to understand it--and almost puts the blame on the reader, instead of the writer, for failing to comprehend the theory.
"Well, that's all great and everything, Steve, but what are you suggesting?"
I'd say that the best way to continue exploring theory and criticism is to just go with what you understand, or the parts that we understand. If we are unable to grasp a concept purported by a theorist/philosopher, the blame is most honestly placed at the feet of the "expressor", not the reader. I think of it this way--if subscribers to a particular school have a hard time explaining a topic advocated by the founder, it probably wasn't that clear or well explained. We can only do our best, take what we can get from it, and then move on to the next bit. After all, if Derrida can take a concept from Saussure and use it in a way that makes it his own, we can do the same with what we do understand.
Monday, October 8, 2007
Response to Dania’s Blog: Libérairance and the Coincident Tyranny of “Versimiltude” and the Modern University Bookstore
Response to Dania’s Blog: Libérairance and the Coincident Tyranny of “Versimiltude” and the Modern University Bookstore
Great Blog, but I have to rebut as a fan of the man. There is a general caveat that I believe should be given with all post-structuralist and (dare I say it) post-post-structuralist thought: we need to keep in mind that différance, like any philosophical conceit, is merely a means (just as traditional dialectical thought was prior to the emergence of différance) of reaching an ends (perhaps a better understanding of the world around us). Lawyers need not agree with Socrates’ vision of “essence” to appropriate his basic argumentative tactic. However, it is also important to remember that through Derrida’s exploration of differential philosophy (as it was explored by previous metaphysicians like Freud, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and FFS Anaximander) we are given access to a verbal toolbox that allows us to view the very idea of a naturalized “core” to linguistic and social intercourse, by which deviant aesthetic and deviant practice is measured as non-approximate and therefore vitiated with its “otherness,” as something that is as contrived as all of the reality shows that emerged in the wake of CBS’s “Survivor.” Concepts of “otherness” didn’t exist (at least in such a vital and robust form as we know it now) in intellectual debate and practice prior to “Structure, Sign and Play,” where Derrida’s systematic deconstruction of the totalizing myths of western metaphysics allows us to begin questioning the idea of a preordained or axiomatic element that pervades, defines, and transcends linguistic and social structure by some divine right of selfsameness or sameness with divinity. This is not to discount prior theory as less than, but see it as something that is not as microscopic and replete in its exploration. Also, this is not to discount later constructionist theory as a concomitant phenomenon or even derivative mode that deserves less attention, but to see it in its modern, post-Derrida form –where it may use differential logic and deconstruction to undermine insidious thought— as a product at the skeletal level of the decenterization of western metaphysics.
Différance is (and here we go) a libérairance (conjunction of the French libérer – to free someone and the French word libraire – a bookseller), a term which I have just now invented and will use to define the simultaneous state being liberated from the mire of sameness and stodgy white, western thought, while at the same time being sold a clutch of really expensive literature theory books based on the same idea that was supposed to free us. Thus there are two reasons to embrace différance; it frees us to look at the world and celebrate difference (though we must navigate it with a modicum of social responsibility), and it keeps me/you/us in business as students of literary theory (though I/you/we must purchase cartloads of books to prove this).
But in all seriousness, let me preface the body of this response by saying that “sameness” grates against my ears, not only because sibilance has always bothered me (it is associated with the devil after all because it is the “same” sound that snakes make) but that conceptually we “know” it is pernicious in its de facto ramifications. Prejudice in all of its forms is based entirely on the concept of verisimilitude, for without a clear cut (although shifting to suit the needs of the present) notion of what we should look for, we would not know what to rail against. I understand that part of this is difference, but what Derrida allows us to do is not deconstruct the difference between the center and structure, but deconstruct the underlying notion that everything is different, but the center. Prejudice, the painful part of noticing differences, can only exist if you undermine the operating concept of essential difference between two individuals by claiming the unity of their respective groups. By destabilizing this center, the one part that exists apart from difference by pointing out its différance, we can make moves toward what we see as ethical progress.
So to continue, “we” are not all the “same.” Take a ride on the subway, or visit the supermarket to see that. Physiologically I may have much in common with most people, but at the same rate I am only 1.4 percent less similar to a chimpanzee than I am to my neighbor—some of you might argue that I am closer to the chimp but we’ll leave that to next week’s blog, which is tentatively titled “A Graduate English department Referendum on Zach, or The Search for the Missing Link at Clark University.” So given the 0.1 percent divergent DNA in each person, and given the general propensity of two people to never agree about which song or station the radio should be tuned to, I can say that we are all “others.” Case in point, I am not even the same as the “other” privileged western, white, middle class fellow who lives next door. I am better looking, smarter, I know I am a better cook, I have an acumen for interior decoration that he does not have, and my football team is far superior (I happen to believe there may be a Raiders fan housed in the next building, unless of course has very poor fashion taste, in which case I also have a better sense of fashion). And in that notion, I loathe the fact that my appearance and mannerism could be used to describe a totalizing aesthetic that posits me as the reference point to which other cultures are differentiated and described. However, part of this (allow the center to exist free from critique, to exist as a naturalized object) is praxis of exclusion made possible by metaphysical notions of the sameness between me and the other people that share common traits.
We are talking about an unjustly time-honored tradition of collecting, categorizing and then collating individuals based (yes in part on difference but) on the “sameness” between the central tradition, its players and its myths, through which difference between the exterior, alien or “other” tradition is engaged and used as a mirror of non-equivalence. That mirror is a picture frame within which exists only a totalized fiction, and aesthetic used to ascribe virtue, and define deceit on its most basic (read intrinsic core of person as virtue or vice) and eventually its extrapolated apparition (intelligent, brave, devoted, fill in the blank with other good civil virtues) while leaving scraps (like secondary virtues that berth from stereotypical image of the “other,” and which always function as a group of marginal talents unnecessary to succeed in the western hemisphere) to the world that exists apart geographically, linguistically, and aesthetically. Hitler asked for verisimilitude, so doesn’t Plato in the “Republic.” We all know what that means.
Moreover, I would argue while “alterity” can be painful, it isn’t necessarily so (at least I would hope not), I know that concepts of verisimilitude are painful (square hole round peg) to all who do not fit the basic criterion. Through verisimilitude I could be linked to Jerry Falwell, George Bush, the Backstreet Boys, and the inventors of fast-food, parachute pants, and the automated telephone answering system. This would be unfair. I certainly celebrate my difference with these characters.
But I love difference and différance. While part of this is rooted in my general self-loathing, the other part is rooted in the idea that realizing and getting over differences has always been a source of serendipity and growth in my life. Without realizing what makes other people unique, I cannot realize what makes me unique. If I look only for sameness, I cannot appreciate life-experience that emerges from without, from “other” people I meet, who exist on the periphery of my personal traditions. If I viewed myself as the undisputed center, and then sought out people that met these criteria I would be a very bored fellow. I would also suggest, that at the philosophical level getting over différance, realizing it is merely a concept for destabilizing untruth rather than a reductive force dissolving language and meaning (and thereby liquidating ethics and morals) into a shapeless and ineffectual liqueur in the crucible of social thought.
On another level entirely, différance keeps me in business, for using the concepts of différance in an essay can account for several pages of literal and figurative word wrangling. It also provides a great center of debate whereby (hopefully) the English departments of the future can continue to feed, and I hope to be there working toward tenure.
And now on to a slight rebuttal. Stating that people learn through sameness is (if we deconstruct the notion) the same as saying people learn through difference. Although baby may need to validate difference through sameness, this is only because of the accumulation of knowledge, and the general need to group, which as I outlined can be very dangerous. Needing to “validate” difference is in and of itself and act of pre-judging an object against a ready defined aesthetic or idea. Thankfully I don’t think this is a necessary or even natural mode of thought, but just a convenient mode of thought. Indeed, while it is easy to move through life grouping like concepts, to accurately tease meaning from something we need to analyze or “To take to pieces; to separate, distinguish, or ascertain the elements of anything complex.” Additionally, it is instincit of the highest order seek difference in difficulty. Just touching on Freud’s notion of “splitting” bears this out. That which is difficult (I would argue impossible) to comprehend in false unity is necessarily divided into constituent elements. Splitting is not an easy process, for the act of distinguishing is more difficult because it requires attention to elements of an object which are unique and not identifiable within the other. It is a last ditch effort to learn something about a concept that is irreducible. To push this idea I will show several more primordial (if you will allow me to misapprehend the roots, and substitute the real Latin meaning of “first thing” with a logic that would assume it can also mean “something that predates order”) acts of learning that involve difference, thus showing how difference preexists verisimilitude.
Part of identity formation is difference, and this is good. If children naturally assumed that everything they see is the "exact" same as themselves—that is learning in the first instance through sameness— they would lead a long and confusing life, but I believe that baby’s initial assumption is that they are different. That is to say, the very first sensory acts involve the recognition that there is [an]other world out there, that is not the self. The eyes open, the ears hurt, the worlds floods in to baby’s life, and hopefully baby cries in a first attempt to communicate with a world that is now necessarily outside and different from baby. Thus, existence itself is an act of differentiating.
If we extend this idea, the first words from baby’s mouth will typically be “Mom” or “Dad.” It is arguably one the first of many chaotic differences a baby encounters, but it is healthy and natural. In that utterance we see inscribed a recognition that binaries and differences do exist on some level (at least if you are not an amoeba), and that part of life is getting over the idea that the other gender has cooties. To continue, the idea of “Mom and Dad,” shares a conjunction, which implies that despite their difference they found a way to get together and bring a new life into the world. In most cases I think this is a good thing, and at the most optimistic it starts life off on the right foot.
Any knowledge acquisition that involves ordering of things based on similarities is not primordial. Order only exists within an order that was itself “constructed” by baby, sometimes through the assistance of others, and thus this order is artificial, and when conceptual clarity is needed the natural mode would be to revert to the first means of acquisition which the search for difference. Verisimilitude (prefect unity) exists outside nature, where even on the atomic level things move in binaries, or at least in moments of difference between things that push beyond binaries, procreative acts (existence as a species) rely on recognition of the differences between the sexes, and the longevity of a species is threatened by a lack of genetic variation.
Now we revisit the brief preface of my little narrative here where I mention that that deconstructive thought should be used responsibly and viewed positively. We can view the definition by difference negatively, where it is merely a means of creating an irreducible concept of language and philosophy, or we can see it as a constructive mode of thought where the individual can be realized. We can choose to look at the parents as a normative model of heterosexual social relation, or we can look at it as the decisive moment where baby learns that differences can be overcome, people can work together to create and people that are the different at the most fundamental level can do some wonderful things when they work together. Moreover, even though Freud would say that through differentiation that baby will eventually form his/her concept of self by identifying with the parent of same gender and contrasting with the parent of differing gender, I like to think of it as cardinal moment where the baby can realize that no two things are the same and that life is full of different ways of forging oneself into an individual. There are no roadmaps, just infinite options.
Lastly, as far as différance the term, part of différance is about change from the previous tradition. So in that notion I added it to my Microsoft Word ™ dictionary, and now spell check will even pick it up if I miss the accent aigu. Whoops, I just had to add aigu. I wonder if French grammar exists. :-) So perhaps there is a lesson here about center and alterity? Word ™ is the center, it is marketed first and best for the English speaking world, and the only francophone terms available for verification (that is to say, we now know they operate outside of our circuit) would be terms that have been previously anglicized or have at the very least found their way into the popular lexicon as idiom or descriptor. Yes, I think it is hegemonic exclusion, for my dictionary readily accepts ‘apologia’ and ‘Cartesian’ among other key terms; so, perhaps there is some exclusion happening here. And on that note, I need to contact that OED so that they can stop discriminating against my term libérairance, and put its true meaning into action by including it in their wonderful book. While they are at it, they could practice its concept by including a comprehensive integrated thesaurus so we can follow chains of signification through synonymic and antonymic function, add a pejorative definition for “sameness” and all related terms, and then drop the retail price of the dictionary to the cost of the material and labor only thus signifying the closure of the practice of making graduate students and undergrads alike pay exorbitant fees for trifles of paper and thought.
Great Blog, but I have to rebut as a fan of the man. There is a general caveat that I believe should be given with all post-structuralist and (dare I say it) post-post-structuralist thought: we need to keep in mind that différance, like any philosophical conceit, is merely a means (just as traditional dialectical thought was prior to the emergence of différance) of reaching an ends (perhaps a better understanding of the world around us). Lawyers need not agree with Socrates’ vision of “essence” to appropriate his basic argumentative tactic. However, it is also important to remember that through Derrida’s exploration of differential philosophy (as it was explored by previous metaphysicians like Freud, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and FFS Anaximander) we are given access to a verbal toolbox that allows us to view the very idea of a naturalized “core” to linguistic and social intercourse, by which deviant aesthetic and deviant practice is measured as non-approximate and therefore vitiated with its “otherness,” as something that is as contrived as all of the reality shows that emerged in the wake of CBS’s “Survivor.” Concepts of “otherness” didn’t exist (at least in such a vital and robust form as we know it now) in intellectual debate and practice prior to “Structure, Sign and Play,” where Derrida’s systematic deconstruction of the totalizing myths of western metaphysics allows us to begin questioning the idea of a preordained or axiomatic element that pervades, defines, and transcends linguistic and social structure by some divine right of selfsameness or sameness with divinity. This is not to discount prior theory as less than, but see it as something that is not as microscopic and replete in its exploration. Also, this is not to discount later constructionist theory as a concomitant phenomenon or even derivative mode that deserves less attention, but to see it in its modern, post-Derrida form –where it may use differential logic and deconstruction to undermine insidious thought— as a product at the skeletal level of the decenterization of western metaphysics.
Différance is (and here we go) a libérairance (conjunction of the French libérer – to free someone and the French word libraire – a bookseller), a term which I have just now invented and will use to define the simultaneous state being liberated from the mire of sameness and stodgy white, western thought, while at the same time being sold a clutch of really expensive literature theory books based on the same idea that was supposed to free us. Thus there are two reasons to embrace différance; it frees us to look at the world and celebrate difference (though we must navigate it with a modicum of social responsibility), and it keeps me/you/us in business as students of literary theory (though I/you/we must purchase cartloads of books to prove this).
But in all seriousness, let me preface the body of this response by saying that “sameness” grates against my ears, not only because sibilance has always bothered me (it is associated with the devil after all because it is the “same” sound that snakes make) but that conceptually we “know” it is pernicious in its de facto ramifications. Prejudice in all of its forms is based entirely on the concept of verisimilitude, for without a clear cut (although shifting to suit the needs of the present) notion of what we should look for, we would not know what to rail against. I understand that part of this is difference, but what Derrida allows us to do is not deconstruct the difference between the center and structure, but deconstruct the underlying notion that everything is different, but the center. Prejudice, the painful part of noticing differences, can only exist if you undermine the operating concept of essential difference between two individuals by claiming the unity of their respective groups. By destabilizing this center, the one part that exists apart from difference by pointing out its différance, we can make moves toward what we see as ethical progress.
So to continue, “we” are not all the “same.” Take a ride on the subway, or visit the supermarket to see that. Physiologically I may have much in common with most people, but at the same rate I am only 1.4 percent less similar to a chimpanzee than I am to my neighbor—some of you might argue that I am closer to the chimp but we’ll leave that to next week’s blog, which is tentatively titled “A Graduate English department Referendum on Zach, or The Search for the Missing Link at Clark University.” So given the 0.1 percent divergent DNA in each person, and given the general propensity of two people to never agree about which song or station the radio should be tuned to, I can say that we are all “others.” Case in point, I am not even the same as the “other” privileged western, white, middle class fellow who lives next door. I am better looking, smarter, I know I am a better cook, I have an acumen for interior decoration that he does not have, and my football team is far superior (I happen to believe there may be a Raiders fan housed in the next building, unless of course has very poor fashion taste, in which case I also have a better sense of fashion). And in that notion, I loathe the fact that my appearance and mannerism could be used to describe a totalizing aesthetic that posits me as the reference point to which other cultures are differentiated and described. However, part of this (allow the center to exist free from critique, to exist as a naturalized object) is praxis of exclusion made possible by metaphysical notions of the sameness between me and the other people that share common traits.
We are talking about an unjustly time-honored tradition of collecting, categorizing and then collating individuals based (yes in part on difference but) on the “sameness” between the central tradition, its players and its myths, through which difference between the exterior, alien or “other” tradition is engaged and used as a mirror of non-equivalence. That mirror is a picture frame within which exists only a totalized fiction, and aesthetic used to ascribe virtue, and define deceit on its most basic (read intrinsic core of person as virtue or vice) and eventually its extrapolated apparition (intelligent, brave, devoted, fill in the blank with other good civil virtues) while leaving scraps (like secondary virtues that berth from stereotypical image of the “other,” and which always function as a group of marginal talents unnecessary to succeed in the western hemisphere) to the world that exists apart geographically, linguistically, and aesthetically. Hitler asked for verisimilitude, so doesn’t Plato in the “Republic.” We all know what that means.
Moreover, I would argue while “alterity” can be painful, it isn’t necessarily so (at least I would hope not), I know that concepts of verisimilitude are painful (square hole round peg) to all who do not fit the basic criterion. Through verisimilitude I could be linked to Jerry Falwell, George Bush, the Backstreet Boys, and the inventors of fast-food, parachute pants, and the automated telephone answering system. This would be unfair. I certainly celebrate my difference with these characters.
But I love difference and différance. While part of this is rooted in my general self-loathing, the other part is rooted in the idea that realizing and getting over differences has always been a source of serendipity and growth in my life. Without realizing what makes other people unique, I cannot realize what makes me unique. If I look only for sameness, I cannot appreciate life-experience that emerges from without, from “other” people I meet, who exist on the periphery of my personal traditions. If I viewed myself as the undisputed center, and then sought out people that met these criteria I would be a very bored fellow. I would also suggest, that at the philosophical level getting over différance, realizing it is merely a concept for destabilizing untruth rather than a reductive force dissolving language and meaning (and thereby liquidating ethics and morals) into a shapeless and ineffectual liqueur in the crucible of social thought.
On another level entirely, différance keeps me in business, for using the concepts of différance in an essay can account for several pages of literal and figurative word wrangling. It also provides a great center of debate whereby (hopefully) the English departments of the future can continue to feed, and I hope to be there working toward tenure.
And now on to a slight rebuttal. Stating that people learn through sameness is (if we deconstruct the notion) the same as saying people learn through difference. Although baby may need to validate difference through sameness, this is only because of the accumulation of knowledge, and the general need to group, which as I outlined can be very dangerous. Needing to “validate” difference is in and of itself and act of pre-judging an object against a ready defined aesthetic or idea. Thankfully I don’t think this is a necessary or even natural mode of thought, but just a convenient mode of thought. Indeed, while it is easy to move through life grouping like concepts, to accurately tease meaning from something we need to analyze or “To take to pieces; to separate, distinguish, or ascertain the elements of anything complex.” Additionally, it is instincit of the highest order seek difference in difficulty. Just touching on Freud’s notion of “splitting” bears this out. That which is difficult (I would argue impossible) to comprehend in false unity is necessarily divided into constituent elements. Splitting is not an easy process, for the act of distinguishing is more difficult because it requires attention to elements of an object which are unique and not identifiable within the other. It is a last ditch effort to learn something about a concept that is irreducible. To push this idea I will show several more primordial (if you will allow me to misapprehend the roots, and substitute the real Latin meaning of “first thing” with a logic that would assume it can also mean “something that predates order”) acts of learning that involve difference, thus showing how difference preexists verisimilitude.
Part of identity formation is difference, and this is good. If children naturally assumed that everything they see is the "exact" same as themselves—that is learning in the first instance through sameness— they would lead a long and confusing life, but I believe that baby’s initial assumption is that they are different. That is to say, the very first sensory acts involve the recognition that there is [an]other world out there, that is not the self. The eyes open, the ears hurt, the worlds floods in to baby’s life, and hopefully baby cries in a first attempt to communicate with a world that is now necessarily outside and different from baby. Thus, existence itself is an act of differentiating.
If we extend this idea, the first words from baby’s mouth will typically be “Mom” or “Dad.” It is arguably one the first of many chaotic differences a baby encounters, but it is healthy and natural. In that utterance we see inscribed a recognition that binaries and differences do exist on some level (at least if you are not an amoeba), and that part of life is getting over the idea that the other gender has cooties. To continue, the idea of “Mom and Dad,” shares a conjunction, which implies that despite their difference they found a way to get together and bring a new life into the world. In most cases I think this is a good thing, and at the most optimistic it starts life off on the right foot.
Any knowledge acquisition that involves ordering of things based on similarities is not primordial. Order only exists within an order that was itself “constructed” by baby, sometimes through the assistance of others, and thus this order is artificial, and when conceptual clarity is needed the natural mode would be to revert to the first means of acquisition which the search for difference. Verisimilitude (prefect unity) exists outside nature, where even on the atomic level things move in binaries, or at least in moments of difference between things that push beyond binaries, procreative acts (existence as a species) rely on recognition of the differences between the sexes, and the longevity of a species is threatened by a lack of genetic variation.
Now we revisit the brief preface of my little narrative here where I mention that that deconstructive thought should be used responsibly and viewed positively. We can view the definition by difference negatively, where it is merely a means of creating an irreducible concept of language and philosophy, or we can see it as a constructive mode of thought where the individual can be realized. We can choose to look at the parents as a normative model of heterosexual social relation, or we can look at it as the decisive moment where baby learns that differences can be overcome, people can work together to create and people that are the different at the most fundamental level can do some wonderful things when they work together. Moreover, even though Freud would say that through differentiation that baby will eventually form his/her concept of self by identifying with the parent of same gender and contrasting with the parent of differing gender, I like to think of it as cardinal moment where the baby can realize that no two things are the same and that life is full of different ways of forging oneself into an individual. There are no roadmaps, just infinite options.
Lastly, as far as différance the term, part of différance is about change from the previous tradition. So in that notion I added it to my Microsoft Word ™ dictionary, and now spell check will even pick it up if I miss the accent aigu. Whoops, I just had to add aigu. I wonder if French grammar exists. :-) So perhaps there is a lesson here about center and alterity? Word ™ is the center, it is marketed first and best for the English speaking world, and the only francophone terms available for verification (that is to say, we now know they operate outside of our circuit) would be terms that have been previously anglicized or have at the very least found their way into the popular lexicon as idiom or descriptor. Yes, I think it is hegemonic exclusion, for my dictionary readily accepts ‘apologia’ and ‘Cartesian’ among other key terms; so, perhaps there is some exclusion happening here. And on that note, I need to contact that OED so that they can stop discriminating against my term libérairance, and put its true meaning into action by including it in their wonderful book. While they are at it, they could practice its concept by including a comprehensive integrated thesaurus so we can follow chains of signification through synonymic and antonymic function, add a pejorative definition for “sameness” and all related terms, and then drop the retail price of the dictionary to the cost of the material and labor only thus signifying the closure of the practice of making graduate students and undergrads alike pay exorbitant fees for trifles of paper and thought.
Friday, October 5, 2007
Derrida's Differance with a Difference
Dania has kindly accepted my invitation to post one of her journals for Contemporary Literary Theory. It should be fun for you guys trying to make sense of the mad, mad, mad, mad world of deconstruction, and I'd like to see others post some of their reactions through the comments. As the blog begins to proliferate through the English Department, I'll be sending "invitations" to others to post as authors. Cheerio!
--Thanks, Dania!
-- Jay
So Derrida, since this is a blog, I am allowed to take you personally and express my discomfort with your brilliant theory of differance which, by the way, my computer keeps changing to ‘difference’. And why would it change it to difference over and over again when it is you of whom we speak, and therefore 'differance' should be accepted? Well, because as you have pointed out, spellcheck does not see differance’s closeness to ‘difference’ but its difference from it. Spellcheck uses the English word ‘difference’ as its reference point, and although (if I am to follow your logic) the standard term is itself fleeting and different from something else, it is, for Microsoft Spellcheck and in this moment that I now use it, the paragon of rightness. Is ‘difference’ still only defined by its difference from ‘differance’? Politics of English dictate otherwise. It dictates that for specific times, purposes and majors (such as mine) one is incorrect and another acceptable, and therein rests the core of my discomfort.
You see Derrida, if we lived in a fair apolitical world, your theory may have been more credible to me. But when you define sameness as difference, alterity as otherness, you begin to lose me. All things being equal, all signs could possibly just be defined by their difference from other signs; that does seem a fair way to level all. However, some things (and I am [maybe fallaciously] extrapolating here) are singled out, ridiculed, and discriminated against for their difference. Difference is not something that is naturally desirable in many contexts, especially when difference could mean discrimination or even death. When difference means otherness, the implications can be horrific, though not always and in varying degrees.
All kinds of variables come into play here. You see, your theory runs the risk of pivoting on the axis of time and not relativity as you had hoped. When my baby sister is learning something new, she forms patterns with what she learnt before that may seem similar to what she is at present required to learn. That, to me, involves sameness before difference. But stay with me here, say it is the new concept’s difference that makes her eventually grasp it; I always have to explain why it is she should accept this new sign when it is so similar to an old one with which she is already familiar. If even momentarily, the new thing must to her validate itself, its difference. It does not naturally get the same respect that the known has already got. If all were implicitly defined by their difference before and despite all other features, why was your brilliantly coined ‘differance’ not readily accepted by my computer? ‘Difference’s’ difference from your ‘differance’ made it bear “the trace”of otherness (278). Your ‘Differance’s’ difference from the standard English ‘difference’ set yours apart as ‘other’ and [therefore] a sign to be shunned, or worse, converted into the ‘correct’. For what its worth, I know you meant 'differance'.
So maybe it is hegemony I should be blaming and not you then, Derrida. You think?
--Thanks, Dania!
-- Jay
So Derrida, since this is a blog, I am allowed to take you personally and express my discomfort with your brilliant theory of differance which, by the way, my computer keeps changing to ‘difference’. And why would it change it to difference over and over again when it is you of whom we speak, and therefore 'differance' should be accepted? Well, because as you have pointed out, spellcheck does not see differance’s closeness to ‘difference’ but its difference from it. Spellcheck uses the English word ‘difference’ as its reference point, and although (if I am to follow your logic) the standard term is itself fleeting and different from something else, it is, for Microsoft Spellcheck and in this moment that I now use it, the paragon of rightness. Is ‘difference’ still only defined by its difference from ‘differance’? Politics of English dictate otherwise. It dictates that for specific times, purposes and majors (such as mine) one is incorrect and another acceptable, and therein rests the core of my discomfort.
You see Derrida, if we lived in a fair apolitical world, your theory may have been more credible to me. But when you define sameness as difference, alterity as otherness, you begin to lose me. All things being equal, all signs could possibly just be defined by their difference from other signs; that does seem a fair way to level all. However, some things (and I am [maybe fallaciously] extrapolating here) are singled out, ridiculed, and discriminated against for their difference. Difference is not something that is naturally desirable in many contexts, especially when difference could mean discrimination or even death. When difference means otherness, the implications can be horrific, though not always and in varying degrees.
All kinds of variables come into play here. You see, your theory runs the risk of pivoting on the axis of time and not relativity as you had hoped. When my baby sister is learning something new, she forms patterns with what she learnt before that may seem similar to what she is at present required to learn. That, to me, involves sameness before difference. But stay with me here, say it is the new concept’s difference that makes her eventually grasp it; I always have to explain why it is she should accept this new sign when it is so similar to an old one with which she is already familiar. If even momentarily, the new thing must to her validate itself, its difference. It does not naturally get the same respect that the known has already got. If all were implicitly defined by their difference before and despite all other features, why was your brilliantly coined ‘differance’ not readily accepted by my computer? ‘Difference’s’ difference from your ‘differance’ made it bear “the trace”of otherness (278). Your ‘Differance’s’ difference from the standard English ‘difference’ set yours apart as ‘other’ and [therefore] a sign to be shunned, or worse, converted into the ‘correct’. For what its worth, I know you meant 'differance'.
So maybe it is hegemony I should be blaming and not you then, Derrida. You think?
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